The Dearing Dialogue

This week the American Anthropological Association (AAA) layed out their long awaited position on the Human Terrain System (HTS).  Essentially, they criticized the US military for thinking it can use anthropology in an unjust war (Iraq and presumably Afghanistan included), but left open the future use of anthropology in the military, but of course only under the guidance of the AAA.  However, the only idea of guidance they provide is what the AAA considers “ethical”.  Are we ever to be in a circumstance which they can agree is completely “ethical”?  Anthropologists can not even agree upon precise definitions.  Thus, it should be little surprise that support of the AAA is waning.  I would not be surprised to see it break apart into splinter groups over this very topic.  The level of elitism spewing out of the ivory tower of the AAA leadership is paramount to the same arrogance they accuse the US leadership of. 

AAA Resolution

In the context of a war that is widely recognized as a denial of human rights and based on faulty intelligence and undemocratic principles, the Executive Board sees the HTS project as a problematic application of anthropological expertise, most specifically on ethical grounds.  We have grave concerns about the involvement of anthropological knowledge and skill in the HTS project.  The Executive Board views the HTS project as an unacceptable application of anthropological expertise.  

 

The Executive Board affirms that anthropology can and in fact is obliged to help improve U.S. government policies through the widest possible circulation of anthropological understanding in the public sphere, so as to contribute to a transparent and informed development and implementation of U.S. policy by robustly democratic processes of fact-finding, debate, dialogue, and deliberation.  It is in this way, the Executive Board affirms, that anthropology can legitimately and effectively help guide U.S. policy to serve the humane causes of global peace and social justice.

Packer writes a bit on the use of Human Terrain Teams in Iraq and Afghanistan in his New Yorker blog on July 20th.  He sees a growing relationship between social scientists and soldiers, a mixture typically considered taboo in the past.  The professionalization of both sides of the spectrum, coupled with theoretical and practical “antagonisms” led to what Packer explains as “isolated American sub-culutres”. 

This year, the Army is actually deploying teams of social scientists with units in Baghdad and Afghanistan (…) The best soldiers I met in Iraq were eager to share critical views with professors and journalists. This past spring, when McMaster led a group of officials and private citizens to Iraq to assess progress there, he picked as one member an anti-war British political-science professor who happens to know a great deal about the country. Desperate times breed desperate measures. 

While the disconnect between American culture and military culture has often caused the military to be shunned from college campuses in the past, and created contempt amongst the military community (as international relations professor Andrew Bacevich often writes about), the divisions are becoming less prominent.  Both sides are beginning to realize the utiliy of the other and that moral and political compromises are essential towards forging a coherent plan of success in US foreign policy.  Packer is indeed correct when he ends: 

But a superpower can hardly afford to have its thinkers and its warriors despise and avoid one another.

Also see:  DNI Conference

From NY Times, Sunday, July 22:

(…) when asked how the United States would respond if Al Qaeda were to plot a successful attack on the United States from the tribal areas (Pakistan), the answer from one intelligence officials was direct: “We’d go in and flatten it.”

Jon Lee Anderson writes a brilliant piece in the New Yorker on opium farming in Afghanistan.  Anderson travels to Oruzgan Province (red area on map) with the Afghan Eradication Force (AEF) and US DEA counternarcotics agent Douglas Wankel, who is overseeing the eradication process. 

Opium has now become a major counter-insurgency operation in Afghanistan.  Since last year, the production of opium has increased in Afghanistan by 60%.   The Taliban, who once considered opium harvesting unholy, now uses it as a means to control the population in Southern and Eastern Afghanistan - areas of greatest Taliban influence.  The coalition is at odds in how to deal with a product that is both sustaining the power of the Taliban and the livelihood of local residents.  Dutch forces are using a stand-off approach focused on making the Taliban an irrelevant presence and an unpopular choice for residents by promoting alternative crops.  DEA agent, Wankel is apprehensive:

“Most or all Europeans are opposed to eradication—they’re into winning hearts and minds,” he said. “But it’s our view that it isn’t going to work. There has to be a measured, balanced use of force along with hearts and minds.” He conceded, however, that the Uruzgan operation fell squarely on the use-of-force side of the scale. Later, he told me, aid, seed, and fertilizer would be offered to the farmers around Tirin Kot, but not yet. Other Americans were frankly contemptuous of the Dutch policy, which they regarded as softheaded.”

Of course, when alternatives don’t exist, the farmers will fall back on what they know best and what has supported them in the past.  Opium will give them over $500 an acre of harvest, while wheat may net $50 an acre.  At the same time, development from the Kabul is unequal and often corrupt.  It is based on tribal loyalties according to one local Afghan in Anderson’s article:

“The Karzai government doesn’t give the money to poor farmers growing poppy. It gives it only to its friends who grow it”—corrupt officials and landowners with political influence. (Many of the farmers were sharecroppers.) “We would be happy to stop growing opium if they would give us some help, and stop giving the money meant for us to thieves.” Instead of receiving aid from government officials, Ahmad said, “if they tell us to break the poppies, we must pay them not to.”

At the same time, areas where the Taliban are strongest tend to go untouched in the eradication process.  Whereas, areas with the greatest influence from the central government are hit hard and tend to alienate the local residents. 

It has also proven virtually impossible to conduct in districts where the Taliban are relatively strong, thereby inevitably penalizing farmers in pro-government districts.”

And corruption is enemic within the central government.  In a previous entry, I explained how one governor was arrested for holding tons of opium in his provincial office.  In Anderson’s article, he finds the AEF police providing security are working with sticky hands:

I walked past one of the jeeps where some of Qassem’s policemen, dressed in robes and sparkly skullcaps, were laughing and talking with the opium growers. I caught a whiff of something burning as I passed. They were smoking hashish.

The opium harvest is a linchpin that must be addressed in the broader context of the Taliban insurgency.  We must focus on alternatives for local farmers and provide those as incentives to steer residents away from Taliban influence.  Understanding the human terrain of Oruzgan and other provinces is the only way to ensure we quell insurgent complicity, but to prevent it from perpetuating itself.

A Dutch and Afghan military patrol in Oruzgan Province of Afghanistan rolled into a police station and found:

The police officers there were cultivating poppy within the compound’s walls, openly participating in the heroin trade. The Afghan Army squad that visited them, itself only partly equipped, did nothing.  (NY Times)

Poppy production is the #1 export for the new Afghan economy.  Eradicating the problem will take more than simply burning fields or preventing the harvest of crops.  Professor Thomas Johnson at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey suggests the US buys all existing poppy and use it for medicinal purposes in the States, such as production of morphine.  Then we provide the Afghan farmers with the knowledge and means toward producing new, sustainable crops that have both domestic and export value.  The Bush Administration does not support such a plan however.  Could Afghanistan become another Columbia solution?

One area of the current global war on terror I’m finding intriguing is a rather unfamiliar but controversial idea of exploiting culture in order to achieve desired results.  This is not necessarily something new.  In fact, unconvential and even conventional wars have in some way used culture as a “weapon”.  The best modern example of this is the Abu Ghraib method of torture where inmates were subjected to sexual activities they found unacceptable in their Islamic culture.  This was used as a means to coerce inmates to give in to interrogation by breaking their will to resist.  An article I recently read: Anthropology in the Military  provided a brief history on culture as a weapon and argued for a more active involvment of anthropologists in the service of the state.  Of course, this runs contrary to the anthropologists moral creed against using the culture of another people.  Such an action by your typical academic anthropologist would not only break the bond of trust between the studied culture and the academic, but also prevent future academics from regaining the trust of other cultures.  One can see the dilemma for both researcher and state operative.  While the lack of cultural understanding has certainly prevented the US from gaining lasting political compromises, the exploitation of it could equally undermine such political gains.  A balance is needed.

This year the US military may have found a way to bypass the anthropologist dilemma by creating its own source of cultural intelligence gatherers, otherwise known as Human Terrain Teams (HTT).  They are 5 man teams whose mission will consist of collecting cultural, ethnographic data on specific geographical regions in the Middle East.  What will be done with this data presents an important question.  Another look at the Human Terrain System